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I. INTRODUCTION

Universities play a special role in the innovation ecosystem defined
by federal funding agencies, state and federal government research,
private industrial research and development, and intellectual property
laws. Two overlapping and complementary questions define policy and
doctrinal debates over the relationship between universities and
innovation. First, how do we define the boundaries and scope of the
university’s role in innovation? Second, once defined, will special rules
for universities be required under intellectual property laws?
This Article focuses on patent and copyright laws as applied to
universities. Within existing statutes and as part of reform proposals,
universities are sometimes given special treatment with respect to
various dimensions of intellectual property. 1 Ownership rules may be
* Crandall Melvin Professor of Law & Director, Technology Commercialization Law Program,
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tailored to the unique organizational form of universities, specifically in
the various types of employees and the unique status of students, faculty,
and staff. In turn, defenses such as experimental use and fair use may
have unique applications that take into account the university’s status as
a not-for-profit entity dedicated to education and research. 2 Recent
patent reform notably enacted tailored defenses of prior user rights
because universities do not actively engage in the direct manufacture of
technologies. 3 Finally, in the ongoing debate over patent reform to
address the problem of frivolous litigation by non-practicing entities
(“NPE”), or trolls, there is a case for excluding universities from the
NPE classification. 4 These examples are the basis for the analytical
section of this Article, assessing whether universities should be granted
special treatment under patent and copyright laws.
Past disputes can provide context for current debates. A search of
intellectual property opinions involving universities uncovers the first
published opinion regarding university intellectual property in 1930.
Relevant cases from that year involved a trademark dispute over the
term “University Clothes, Inc.” 5 and a copyright dispute involving Yale
University Press. 6 The search uncovered over 700 reported opinions
since 1930 involving intellectual property and universities. This body of
opinions shows the increasing importance of intellectual property for
universities. It also shows that the number of intellectual property
opinions involving universities is small compared to the larger body of
intellectual property disputes.
Assessment of intellectual property rules for universities rests on
understanding how they function as organizations. This inquiry is both
positive and normative. For example, Peter Lee identifies two tendencies
in the relationship between intellectual property and universities. 7 One is
that of academic exceptionalism, which exempts universities from many
of the protocols and policies of intellectual property law. The other
Syracuse University College of Law. BA, Amherst College; MA, PhD, University of Michigan
Michigan; JD, Stanford Law School. This article was originally presented as a talk at the conference
on universities held at the University of Akron School of Law, October, 2015. The author would
like to thank Professors Jacqueline Lipton and Ryan Vacca for organizing the event.
1. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 64-75 (2013).
2. See, e.g., id. at 25-26.
3. See id. at 71-73.
4. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612-13 (2008) (“Universities are non-practicing entities. They share some
characteristics with trolls . . . but they are not.”)
5. Panitz v. University Clothes, 40 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
6. Yale University Press v. Row, Peterson & Co., 40 F.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y 1930).
7. Lee, supra note 1.
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tendency is one of internalization, as university culture becomes
integrated into the commercial assumptions underlying intellectual
property laws. Professor Lee reconciles these two tendencies by
describing universities as entities imbued with a public purpose. 8 This
public purpose allows the universities to act within the world of
intellectual property law with limits to include the public-minded ends of
university management.
The American university, however, has undergone many challenges
as the organization navigates the pulls of commercialization and the
demands of the many constituencies it serves.9 At any point in time, a
university may be serving many goals, some purely private and some
purely public. 10 As universities seek revenue sources from athletics,
teaching, and research, they act not all that differently from for-profit
corporations. At the same time, as universities seek to diversify faculty
and the student body and serve the needs of local communities, they act
like charitable organizations. Aggregating the various pulls on
universities into one criterion such as public purpose is difficult, if not
impossible. Instead universities are multivalent, and managed along
multiple criteria. This is the principal theme of this Article.
Interactions between private interests and public rights within
universities dictate how researchers and scientists negotiate the need for
practical, industrial application and pure, scientific knowledge. 11
Intellectual property law and policy creates special rules based on the
complex dynamic between universities and innovation, and it should
continue to do so as universities shift between models of pure research
and pure commercialization. The special rules for universities represent
legislative compromises that rest in part on an idealized view of
universities and on the real politics of law-making in a world of
university-industry collaboration. 12 This Article presents a multivalent
model that offers a positive account of university governance, which can
guide intellectual property policy as set forth in both legislation and in
8. Id. at 75-76.
9. See LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 252 (1965)
(tracking the development of the university’s role from that of providing religious education to that
of pure research within a liberal culture).
10. Id. at 346-48 (setting forth various business models for universities).
11. See STEVEN SHAPIN, NEVER PURE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE AS IF IT WAS
PRODUCED BY PEOPLE WITH BODIES, SITUATED IN TIME, SPACE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY, AND
STRUGGLING FOR CREDIBILITY AND AUTHORITY 213-14 (2010) (analyzing the dilemma facing the
industrial scientist navigating the tensions between the culture of universities and that of industry).
12. See, e.g., WENDY SCHACHT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE UNITED
STATES, RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 4 (2006).
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university administration.
What distinguishes this Article is its focus on the university as an
organization. While a university is an institution embodying specific
values of a community (whether local, national, or global), a university
is a collection of individuals coming together to interact in a community.
As an organization, a university has to choose its governance structure,
including its management of intellectual property rights and the
attendant relationships among researchers, teachers, students, and
administrators. 13 When I ask whether a university pursues pure research,
pure commercialization, or a mix, I am asking a question about how a
university is organized. It is the focus on the university’s organization
that distinguishes the approach of this Article from other scholarly work.
Answering the question of whether universities are special requires
delving into the purpose of universities, particularly in the broader
innovation ecosystem. Part II of this Article presents three specific
models of the university, which address these bigger questions stated
above. These specific models are meant to be both descriptive and
normative and serve as a benchmark for assessing the contributions of
universities to innovation. As one application of these three models, I
look at the specific case of university athletics. This example introduces
many of the analytic issues pertinent to understanding the role of the
university in innovation. Part III presents the special rules arising in
intellectual property laws for the treatment of universities. The models
presented in Part II provide a foundation for assessing these special rules
normatively for intellectual property policy. Part IV concludes by stating
that universities are special and recognizes that organizational choice
plays a critical role in federal and state policies for invention,
innovation, and development of intellectual property. My bottom line is
that the special rules represent legislative compromises that rest in part
on an idealized view of universities and on the real politics of law
making in a world of university-industry collaboration.
II. ROLES OF THE UNIVERSITY
Universities are seemingly timeless institutions, serving as
sanctuaries for those who want to engage in ideas, learning, and cultural
milestones for personal development. Perhaps Plato’s Academy is the
13. See, e.g., MAKERERE UNIVERSITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT POLICY
(March 13, 2008) (on file with author) (setting forth intellectual property and governance rules in a
university in Uganda and illustrating the importance of organization rules for universities in
developing countries).
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earliest example of a university offering an informal venue for dialogue,
unfettered by curricula and driven solely by wide ranging inquiry. 14
Nalanda University in Bihar, India, University of Bologna, Oxford, and
Cambridge are the old-world models, offering more structure than the
Academy but serving a similar role as haven for the inquisitive and
contemplative. 15
The modern university is associated with the United States, but
U.S. universities take many forms. Established and elite universities like
Harvard and Yale were founded for the moral education of men and to
instill spiritual values associated with good citizenship and
participation. 16 This model was transmitted throughout the Colonies, and
the tradition continues through today, even if the spiritual virtues have
taken on a more professional dimension targeted towards the
development of a managerial class. Land grant universities were a
government venture aimed at turning newly acquired territories into
institutions providing practical training for citizens of the newly
recognized states. 17 Practical, at the time, had a broad meaning going
beyond narrow job training to include problem solving and engagement
with the broader population. For land grants, the sanctuary of the
university served a public purpose. Add to these two models the
technical colleges, the technical institutes, community colleges, and city
universities, and we obtain a rich picture of universities as institutions:
establishments that were vital and critical for the functioning of the
country with a range of options for those who sought civic engagement
or introspection.
German universities enter into our understanding of university
models in part through their influence on the organization of university
administration. 18 Bureaucratization and the development of departments
opened the way for governance within the university, permitting the
offering of greater services and options for its constituencies, primarily
students. German universities were the models for elite U.S. universities
in the late nineteenth century, providing a rigorous theoretical training
14. See Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 209, 213 n. 15 (2004); Edward J. Conry & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, MetaJurisprudence: A Paradigm for Legal Studies, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 691, 735 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Garten, Really Old School Higher Education in Asia, INT’L HERALD
TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2006), 2006 WLNR 21360007 (describing Nalanda University as one of the first
great universities that died a slow death around the time the great European universities, including
Oxford and University of Bologna, were getting started).
16. See VEYSEY, supra note 9, at 32-33.
17. Id. at 70-71.
18. Id. at 128-29.
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that rose above technical schools. 19 Particularly, elite law schools were
fashioned in the manner of German universities providing doctrinal
training within scientific traditions.20
After World War II, as the centers for university excellence shifted
to England and the United States and away from devastated Germany,
new visions of the university came to the fore in the United States.21 The
mega-university took the bureaucratized university to new heights,
serving large populations of students and providing secure positions for
academics and staff. Scientific research and development became the
foundation for innovation policy as federal policymakers focused on
ways to avoid the catastrophic downturn of the Great Depression.
Federal agencies would provide funding for university researchers who
would in turn generate new ideas, new products, and new inventions to
feed industry. 22 Even if universities would not commercialize products,
they would provide the resources, the seed capital from the intellect, for
commercialization that would invariably feed the American consumer.
But this scheme did not rule out the possibility of new companies and
industries springing forth from within the university. However, there
was a sense that the business of universities was not business, even if
universities would sometimes be in close partnership with
entrepreneurs. 23
Against this historical background, we can identify three models for
the contemporary university, particularly as we understand its
relationship to intellectual property. The first is the model of the
university as the producer of pure research, which is discussed in Part
II.A. The second is the model of the university as a commercial entity
with a public purpose, which is discussed in Part II.B. The third and final
model, discussed in Part II.C, is the model of the university as a pure
commercial entity, no different from a for-profit corporation. Let us
examine each model in turn and assess its implications. The analysis will
set the foundation for our understanding of specific patent and copyright
doctrines as applied to universities.
A. Universities as Pure Research Entities
One idealized view of the university is as a producer of pure
19. See Mark Bartholomew, Legal Separation: The Relationship Between the Law School
and the Central University in the Late Nineteenth Century, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 368, 377-78 (2003).
20. See id. at 378-79.
21. See VEYSEY, supra note 9, at 312-13.
22. See, e.g., SCHACHT, supra note 12, at 5.
23. See, e.g., id.
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research 24 with its core constituencies, faculty, and students pursuing
questions independent of commercial or financial concerns. It would be
hard to deny the inherent value of free and open inquiry, untethered from
concerns of profit and internal rates of return. The interesting question is
to what extent can universities match this ideal in practice? Resource
constraints and scarcity of time and money may limit how far faculty
and students can thrive in a rarified environment of free wielding
inquiry, guided solely by the rigors of particular disciplines.
Santiniketan, the lovely rural university created by Bengali poet and
novelist Rabindranath Tagore, is the closest I have seen to such a utopia.
Liberal arts colleges, tucked away in United States hinterlands,
sometimes emanate pure intellectual pleasure and engagement even if
marred by pressures of upward mobility and maintenance of social
standing. St. John’s University, with its Santa Fe and Annapolis
campuses, requires commitment to a four-year, great-books program that
immerses students in the development of Western Civilization. 25 If one
were to construct a world from nothing, the need for some institution
that allows for unadulterated thinking would be readily apparent; that
institution would have many of the characteristics of actual universities.
While the temptation to exult pure research may stem from the
desire to seek knowledge for knowledge’s sake, there is a practical
reason to focus on pure research. Concentration on fundamental
questions allows disciplines to flourish and evolve. This is true whether
that discipline is in the natural sciences, the search for understanding the
work in which we live; in the humanities, the search for how thinking
and emotions evolve in the individual personality; or in social cultures,
with its dimensions of language, history, arts, and religion. This practical
turn does not tarnish the purist model of the university. Human inquiry is
not solely about having one’s heads in the clouds, but also about being
aware of the ground one walks upon. Pure research, to put it bluntly, can
be both theoretical and applied.
Where the purist model starts to tarnish is through considerations of
finance. To live the life of pure research requires resources. Some
institutions, like Santiniketan, may have the benefit of healthy
endowments, but such endowments have to be maintained, leading to
dull, practical questions of where to invest, how much to invest, and
24. I do not mean to exclude teaching from the mission of the university by using the word
“research.” I am using that word expansively to include inquiry, and teaching would be part of the
broader meaning.
http://www.sjc.edu/academic25. Academic Programs,
ST. JOHN’S COLLEGE,
programs/undergraduate/liberal-arts/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
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where to place the returns. Institutions without endowments have more
basic questions to ask about sources of money to run a going concern. 26
Practical research may readily become one revenue stream, requiring
engagement with the world of commerce. Once that happens, the luster
of the pure research model fades, and the choice has to be made whether
the university becomes a profit center or continues with its idealized
mission. The second model suggests a way that the institution can
accomplish both.
B. Universities as Commercial Entities with Public Purpose
A second idealized view permits universities pursuing commercial
ends but for a public purpose, which can be construed in many ways. As
mentioned at the end of the previous section, the dual-purpose university
satisfies both the need for profit and the pursuit of pure ideas. A
university can be run as a business through the identification of revenue
streams. These streams can include the commercialization of products
and services developed within the university such as courses, patentable
inventions, copyrightable content, and branded merchandise. 27 But what
keeps the university from turning into an amusement park or a cruise
ship on land is the demand of channeling profits towards public goals.
The most likely candidate for these public goals would be the pursuit of
pure research. However, like running water, currency can move towards
many destinations, and the ocean of pure knowledge may be only one.
As nonprofit organizations, universities need to put their profits back
into the organization rather than making a payout to residual claimants,
whether shareholders, partners, or members. By putting profits back into
the organization, a university uses commercialization presumably to
finance its public purposes.
The challenge for this model is the implication for the organization
of for-profit universities. There is nothing within the model that rules out
the possibility of for-profit universities so long as the entity uses its
profits for public purposes. Defining these public purposes for a forprofit university is the difficult issue. Public purposes might include
scholarships for students, research support for faculty, or funding for
local community projects. But public purpose might also include
26. See, e.g., Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown Over University Endowments:
Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1800 (2009) (“Because the magnitude of activity
is smaller at a liberal arts college, it needs fewer resources than a large research university.”).
27. See, e.g., Elizabeth Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing
“Teacher Exception” or Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV.
209, 220 (2003).
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international programs and other initiatives that extend beyond the
traditional domain of the university. Conceptually, public purpose entails
redefining the residual claimants of the surplus from a for-profit
university to include a broader class of beneficiaries in the community.
Doctrinally, the for-profit university could best be understood as a type
of benefit corporation with the beneficiaries being defined by the
founders and set forth in the corporate documents.
One concern with the public purpose model is that the definition of
public purpose can expand to include interests that might seem more
akin to private ones. For example, public benefits may align with private
interests of founders or professors, such as the local symphony or
regional art museum or with political causes and campaigns.
Furthermore, the commercial goals of universities to accumulate
financial surpluses might lead the university to focus solely on
commercialization efforts, losing sight of any broader public benefit,
however altruistically set forth in the founding documents. A cynic
might say that universities inevitably collapse into the model of pure
commercial activity, no different from other for-profit business
organizations. But even without accepting that cynical position, a realist
might still predict the inevitable collapse of the pure or modified models
into the third model described in the next section.
C. Universities as Pure Commercial Entities
The third idealized view of the university is as a pure commercial
entity no different from a for-profit corporation. To call this model
idealized may seem misguided as reducing a university to the status of
any other business entity eviscerates the institution of any noble ideals of
learning and research. But the university as a locus of pure self-interest
is idealized in the sense of serving as a rarified model for the purposes of
analysis, a benchmark against which to gauge policy choices. This
model is also idealized in the sense that it is wholly unrealistic, ignoring
not only important virtues but also practical details of the university
mission.
Among some, there may be superficial appeal in treating
universities like any other business entity, driven by the profit motive
and the necessity of meeting payroll. An implication of this conception
of the universities is that they should be left to fail, no matter how big
they are, if they cannot produce certain measures of success, whether
they be profits, graduates, or research. For those familiar with postThatcher academia, this picture should be familiar as British universities
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and academies are subject to unavoidable scrutiny of university outputs.
With the example of contemporary British universities, it seems that this
model is not pure fantasy and is one that seems to have been adopted.
Should this model be ruled out on its face? Faithful adherents to the
pure research model might say yes. I may be one of these adherents, but
am also willing to play the advocate here of the pure commercialization
model. The defense would work as follows. Organizational success is
important for society. One measure of success is survival in a
competitive environment. Organizations that survive a competitive
environment have characteristics of efficiency in delivering outputs that
society finds desirable. Therefore, universities need to demonstrate their
success by thriving in a competitive environment just like any other
entity in order to benefit society.
The healthy competition argument ignores the many ways in which
competition might be destructive. First, education and research generate
positive externalities or benefits that cannot be fully captured through
market competition. As a result, too little education will be provided and
too little research will result if solely competitive forces determined
outcomes. Second, the creation of universities requires large initial, or
fixed, costs. These large fixed costs require some degree of scale of
production in the marketplace for entities to be profitable. Competitive
forces acting alone can make it difficult, if not impossible, for entities to
generate scale in production. As a result, competitive forces may tend to
drive out most universities that fail to reach a size that would be more
conducive to success. While scale effects and externalities may arise in
many industries, the two together make competitive forces unhealthy
and even unworkable in producing viable, socially desirable universities.
In addition, there are potential problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection in university markets. For example, education requires
initial investments by students who defer present compensation for
future earnings. Universities capitalize on these investments by
accepting tuition payments currently with the expectation of returns to
the training and education presented in the classroom. But once
universities receive these tuition payments, there is an incentive not to
fulfill the promise of training, especially if the educational inputs are
uncertain or hard to completely measure. Therefore, universities might
shirk in providing training (moral hazard), and bad universities might
drive out good ones (adverse selection).
These limitations show that universities may be subject to
regulation in order to deal with the infirmities of market transactions.
This conclusion does not deny the validity of the pure commercialization
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model. It simply states that universities would need to be regulated in
similar ways as other entities that produce positive externalities, incur
high fixed costs, and are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection.
The form of those regulations would depend upon characteristics of the
industry, paying particular attention to the geographic scope of the
market (regional versus national), the distribution channels in the
marketplace, allocation of information among buyers and sellers,
organizational forms, and other factors.
D. No One Stable Model: How the Three Models Interact
In constructing the governance and regulation of universities, the
specific details of social interactions among faculty, students, staff, and
administrators would guide how regulation is designed and what
transactions are the target of oversight. But in the course of assessing
these social interactions, a regulator would come across the practical
details of university life. Students need housing, access to books, and
support in the education process. Faculty need resources to pursue
teaching and research and tools for governance in interactions with
students and with each other. Regulation comes up against these social
interactions and the cultural values of education and scholarship.
Universities, no matter the depth of commitment to commercialization,
are political and social institutions, little communities, and sometimes
little cities. Therefore, public mindedness and civic virtue must come
into play for university governance. In this way, our three models may
converge, or at least blur. Just as material necessity leads the pure
research model towards the forces of commercialization, the attention to
markets and competition leads to the need for social and cultural norms
that allow universities to cohere into the locus of governance and
regulation.
University athletics provides one example of how these three
models apply to ongoing and compelling policy debates. How should
athletics be regulated? Should athletics serve as a basis for
commercialization or should they be seen as purely intramural? Answers
will rest on how one conceives of the university.
The pure research model, in its extreme form, may support
skepticism of athletics, especially in the all-consuming form. But those
who favor the pure research model because of its appeal to the human
mind would recognize the need for a healthy body to nourish mental
activities. Therefore, college athletics can serve to support pure research
through distraction, entertainment, and exercise. Furthermore, there
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might be a limited practical and commercial benefit from investment in
athletics. So athletics can flourish even within the pure research
university but as a secondary venture that must yield when research is
threatened.
For the university engaging in public minded commercialization,
athletics has a role not only as a source of revenue but also as a basis for
public engagement in competition and team spiritedness. 28 However,
university commitment to athletics may come at the expense of the
public interest. Town-gown relations may lead to tensions between
privileged athletes and targets of abuse in the local community. Within
the university campus, the special status of the college athlete may create
divisions among students, and cause rifts between students and faculty
who face pressures from athletic departments. Furthermore, an
overemphasis on athletics may undermine public values of education
and research as attention is distracted from the classroom to the
gridiron. 29
Athletics may be the lodestone for the purely commercially-minded
university. Merchandising, television rights, ticket sales—each serve as
just one source of many for the generation of revenue. The returns for
investing in athletics can, in turn, finance research and educational
efforts, at least for the successful, large-scale universities. But the
market for college athletics will undoubtedly need regulation as students
can be the victims of exploitation, and competition over intangible
reputation and prizes can distort incentives in a winner take all market.30
Some of these regulations will overlap with the concerns raised in the
pure research model and in the commercialization with public purpose
model. Nevertheless, if we allow universities to wholly focus on
commercialization, to operate like any other firm, a heavy focus on
athletics may require more regulation to address university battles over
revenue streams and intellectual property rights within and across the
university.
The example of athletics demonstrates how the three models would
apply to the issue of intellectual property doctrine and the question
posed in the title of this Article. The pure research and
commercialization with public purpose models would support special
rules for universities to potentially limit the adverse roles of patent and
28. See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 9596 (2011).
29. See Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman, & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform of
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 818, 837 (2010).
30. See id. at 781.
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copyright for the goals of universities. A pure commercialization model
might support a more expansive role for copyright and patent. But, as the
discussion in this section also shows, these models may have
overlapping application. Consequently, actual rules for universities
within copyright and patent illustrate different applications of these
models, emphasizing some goals and downplaying others, depending
upon the context. To discern these conflicting visions of the university in
patent and copyright, we turn in the next section to specific doctrinal
applications.
III. UNIVERSITIES AS OWNERS, USERS, AND ENFORCERS
How does the dynamic of the three models of the university inform
intellectual property policy towards universities? This section examines
that question with particular attention to the issues of ownership in Part
III.A, infringement in Part III.B, and enforcement in Part III.C.
A. Universities as Owners of Patents and Copyrights
Ownership rules for intellectual property would seemingly be
neutral between universities and other entities. Patent rights are initially
allocated to the natural person who invents the patented subject matter.
Whether that natural person invents within a university or a for-profit
context is irrelevant for the basic rule of patent ownership.31 Similarly,
trademarks are owned by the user of the trademark to brand an
association in consumers’ minds between a product or service and the
mark serving as an indicator of source. If a university creates and uses a
trademark to brand its services and products, the university owns the
trademark. Finally, work made for hire under copyright law applies
equally to employees and contractors within universities and those
within for-profit entities. 32 Therefore, the university can be deemed the
author and copyright owner of works created by their employees,
whether faculty, staff, or students. 33 In this section, the focus will be on
patent and copyright ownership rules for universities.
Before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, recipients of federal
research funding and sponsored research grants could not have an

31. See Lee, supra note 1, at 60.
32. See Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance Education and Intellectual Property: The
Realties of Copyright Law and the Culture of Higher Education, 16 TOURO L. REV. 981, 991-92
(2000).
33. See id. at 993.
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ownership interest in patents. 34 This restriction applied to researchers
who received the funding, as well as their employers.35 The limitation on
patent ownership applied to all entities, including universities, for-profit
corporations, and non-profit stand-alone research institutes. 36 In practice,
however, universities and research institutes were the principal
recipients of research grants. Effectively, at one point in time in the
history of U.S. patent law, there were separate rules of patent ownership
for universities. The rationale for not allowing recipients of federal
funding to own patents was one of avoiding double taxation of the
public, who would pay once for the federal funding and would pay again
in purchasing potentially higher priced patented products that resulted
from the funding.
The Bayh-Dole Act removed this prohibition against patent
ownership by allowing recipients of federal funds and sponsored grants
to patent inventions that were the result of the funded research and
development. 37 Double taxation was not seen as a bar because, absent
the patent, an innovative product might not even make it to market.
Therefore, the taxpayer would be paying first for the invention of the
new technology and second for its commercialization. Patents were seen
as underwriting the innovation process while the research funding
stimulated invention and discovery. An open question under the BayhDole Act, however, is who owned the invention that was the fruit of
university research. Commentators, as well as representatives of
universities, read the Bayh-Dole Act as giving the contractor an
ownership interest in the patent as the recipient of the funds. 38 Under this
interpretation, the university would automatically own patented
inventions created by an employee. On the other hand, advocates for
inventors argue that the Bayh-Dole Act did not alter the basic patent rule
that inventors owned their inventions and were initially allocated patent
rights. 39 The United States Supreme Court resolved this issue in its 2011
Stanford v. Roche decision. 40

34. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996).
35. See SCHACHT, supra note 12, at 2.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1.
38. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 31.
39. See Maddy F. Baer, Stephanie Lollo Donahue, & Rebecca J. Cantor, Stanford v. Roche:
Confirming the Basic Patent Law Principle that Inventors Ultimately Have Rights in Their
Inventions, 47 LES NOUVELLES 19, 23 (2012).
40. Bd. of Trs. of the Leeland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.Ct.
2188 (2011).
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The facts of the Stanford case are as follows. As part of a federal
grant obtained from the National Institute of Health, Stanford University
hired a research scientist, Dr. Mark Holodniy, to investigate the
diagnosis and treatment of HIV. 41 Dr. Holodniy signed a promise to
assign future patent rights to Stanford. 42 On a research leave from
Stanford, the scientist visited Cetus where he learned PCR techniques to
sequence genes. 43 As a visitor, he signed an assignment agreeing to
assign future patent rights to Cetus. 44 Holodniy obtained a patent, which
was assigned to Stanford. 45 In the meantime, Roche acquired Cetus who,
under the terms of the assignment agreement from Holodniy, began to
use the technology notwithstanding the fact that the patents were
assigned to Stanford. 46 Stanford sued for patent infringement, and Roche
raised the defense that Stanford had no patent rights. 47 The district court
found for Stanford, basing its decision on the Bayh-Dole Act, which
allegedly assigned priority of rights to Stanford, the recipient of the
federal funds. 48 The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that Stanford did
not have rights under the Bayh-Dole Act and, in fact, had rights
subordinate to those of Roche. 49 The conclusion rested on the wording
of the assignments. Cetus’s assignment agreement stated that Holodniy
“hereby” assigned its future patent rights to Cetus. 50 This language was
construed as a present assignment to the company. On the other hand,
the assignment to Stanford did not contain this language. 51 Therefore,
even though Stanford’s assignment was first in time to be entered into,
the rights conferred onto the university were a future promise to assign
future rights. Consequently, Roche obtained the future patent rights at
the time the assignment was executed, and therefore acquired the patent
rights before Stanford. The university appealed to the Supreme Court on
the question of rights under the Bayh-Dole Act. 52 Whether the Federal
Circuit correctly interpreted the assignments was not raised in the

41. Id. at 2192.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2193.
48. Id. at 2194.
49. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832, 836-37, (Fed. Cir. 2009).
50. Id. at 842.
51. See id. at 841-42.
52. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2195.
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petition for certiorari. 53
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit on the Bayh-Dole
issue. 54 Justice Roberts’ majority opinion starts from the fundamental
principle that the inventor is the initial owner of patent rights.55 Nothing
in the language of the Bayh-Dole Act, he wrote, changed that basic
rule. 56 The Act was permissive, altering the previous rule against patent
ownership by recipients of federal funding. Under the Act’s terms, the
recipient is allowed to own a patent. However, the Act does not grant the
recipient rights in the patent automatically. Instead, patent rights have to
be transferred through an assignment or a license, as with any other
entity. Justice Breyer, in his dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, would
read the Bayh-Dole Act as giving the contractor with the funding
agency, namely the university, outright ownership in any patents that
stem from the funded research. 57 According to the dissent, the BayhDole Act creates a three-tiered system of ownership with patent rights
first going to the university, then to the government, and finally to the
inventor, absent agreements to the contrary. 58 By contrast, Justice
Roberts emphasized common law rules of ownership, which he reasoned
were not modified or abrogated by the Act. 59
University ownership of patents provides an insightful example for
assessing the special treatment of universities. Under the ruling in
Stanford v. Roche, universities do not get special treatment for patent
ownership because they are the recipients of federal research funds. 60
Justice Roberts’ reasoning supports the conclusion that universities are
just like any other entity and therefore subject to the same common law
rules of ownership. This conclusion may be based on an implicit
adoption of the third model, described in the previous section, of treating
universities just like any other commercial entity. While that may be the
effect of the ownership rules, the Court’s rationale may have more to do
with the recognition of inventors’ rights and the importance of clear
abrogation of common law rules by the legislature. The rationale seems
to be one of correct incentives for invention rather than the proper role
of the university, even if the effect is to put universities on the same
level as commercial entities.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 2194 n. 2.
Id. at 2199.
See SCHACHT, supra note 12, at 3.
Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2199.
See id. at 2203-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2200.
Id. at 2194-95 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2197.
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As a final note, it is useful to compare the treatment of ownership
under the Bayh-Dole Act with work made for hire. Under the latter
doctrine, the university would hold the initial entitlement in copyright
for works created by its employees.61 Ostensibly, universities are treated
like other commercial entities for the purposes of copyright ownership. 62
But the rule itself may incorporate differing employment relationships
across differing entities. Within universities, university ownership may
depend on internal rules defining how various constituents, students, and
faculty and staff, are treated for employment purposes. Furthermore, the
teacher exception, recognized in several states, excludes copyrighted
teaching materials from the work made for hire rules. 63 This exception
allows teachers to retain copyright ownership in their teaching materials
even if they are deemed to be employees of the university.
On the surface, ownership rules for patent and copyright suggest a
coequal treatment of universities and commercial entities. But because
of the special circumstances and rules surrounding universities, the equal
application of ownership rules allows for university ownership to serve a
public interest consistent with the second model describing the status of
universities. This public interest can be pursued by specific rules for
defining employee status and through exceptions such as that for
teaching materials.
B. Universities as Infringers and the Experimental Use Defense
Experimental use is a defense to patent infringement, which was
narrowed by the Federal Circuit in its Madey v. Duke University
decision. 64 This defense is analogous to the reverse engineering defense
under trade secret law and the narrow protection for reverse engineering
under copyright fair use. All three doctrines recognize to various degrees
the value of experimentation, research, and study in the creative process.
In the case of copyright, fair use protects from claims of infringement
follow-on creation that facilitates compatibility and interoperability of
conflicting software based systems, such as with videogames. 65 In the

61.
62.

See Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, supra note 32, at 991-93.
See, e.g., JACOB H. ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW
UNIVERSITIES CAPTURE, MANAGE, AND MONETIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND WHY IT
MATTERS (forthcoming 2016).
63. See Eric Priest, Copyright and the Harvard Open Access Mandate, 10 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 377, 403-06 (2012).
64. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
65. See e.g., Karen E. Georgenson, Comment, Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Software:
Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 291, 294-308 (1996).
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case of trade secrets, reverse engineering permits experimentation to
uncover knowledge that is secreted away by a company. 66 Experimental
use, in contrast, is narrower in permitting through its common law form
philosophical inquiry and speculation, but not uses that are motivated by
commercialization. 67
The different treatments of experimentation reflect the different
balances of ownership and use under each area of the law. For copyright,
reverse engineering as fair use reflects the intermingling of
uncopyrightable processes and copyrightable software in videogames.
For trade secrets, reverse engineering sheds sunlight on the opaqueness
of trade secret law. Experimental use under patent law is narrow because
the patent document discloses the invention that anyone can read even if
use of the invention is prohibited. In order to discover the trade secret,
one is allowed to study and take apart the product or process protected
by secrecy. 68 Patent law does not permit experimentation more broadly
because the document reveals the invention.
This narrow conception of experimental use under patent law
follows from the Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey, an opinion based
on a provocative view of the university. Madey, an acclaimed scientist in
the field of lasers, left Stanford University to join the faculty of Duke
University. 69 One of the attractions in joining Duke was the promise of
new lab facilities to house Madey’s patented laser gun. 70 When Madey
left Duke, he left for a time his patented laser in his former lab.71
Researchers at Duke used the laser without his permission, and Madey
sued for patent infringement. 72 Duke University unsuccessfully raised
the experimental defense, pointing to its pure academic purposes in
using the patented tool. 73 The Federal Circuit rejected the defense
because Duke had a commercial interest in its experiments, even if only
indirect. 74 Experiments could lead to research funding, which could lead
to greater research and development that would be the basis for further
patents and commercial ventures. The court’s reasoning reduces most, if

66. See generally Daniel Laster, The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market
License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
621, 639-40 (2006).
67. See Lee, supra note 1, at 25.
68. Laster, supra note 66, at 640.
69. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1353.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1356, 1360.
74. Id. at 1361-63.
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not all, university activity to being commercial in nature. As a result, the
experimental use was found not to apply. 75
Arguably, Duke tried to expand the experimental use defense to
cover all activities by researchers in universities. The University in
effect was asserting a special rule excepting universities from patent
infringement under the experiment use defense. The Federal Circuit
rejected this expansionist view by offering a contrary expansionist
position. 76 The court’s opinion is a broad one, strongly implying that
universities are no different from other commercial entities. The Madey
opinion represents the third model of universities, described above. Pure
research, under the court’s reasoning, would not be possible in a
university; all paths lead to commercialization.77 Public purpose also
seems elusive for a university if one accepts the Federal Circuit’s views.
It is very difficult to distinguish between a university and a commercial,
for-profit entity. Although this equation may apply only to the
experimental use defense, the Federal Circuit’s view of the research
university would imply that there are no special rules for universities
under intellectual property law.
Prior user rights were expanded under the America Invents Act
beyond the narrow confines of business method patents introduced in
1999 amendments to the Patent Act of 1952. 78 If the Federal Circuit’s
Madey opinion would suggest no special rules for universities,
Congress’ treatment of prior user rights demonstrates the need for
special rules in certain circumstances. Comparing the different
approaches of the Federal Circuit and Congress to universities shows
contrasting institutional perspectives as well as the role of universitybased interest group politics in the passage of patent legislation.
Under the America Invents Act (AIA), which added § 273 of the
Patent Act, prior user rights apply to a person who “acting in good faith,
commercially used the subject matter in the United States, either in
connection with an internal commercial use or an actual arm’s length
sale or other arm’s length commercial transfer of a useful end result of
such commercial use.” 79 This commercial use must occur within one
year of either one of two effective dates set forth in the statute. 80

75.
76.
77.
78.
2015).
79.
80.
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The provision expands the definition of commercial use and the
applicability of the defense to include universities. Specifically, the
section provides: “A use of subject matter by a nonprofit research
laboratory or other nonprofit entity, such as a university or hospital, for
which the public is the intended beneficiary, shall be deemed to be a
commercial use . . . except that a defense under this section may be
asserted pursuant to this paragraph only for continued and
noncommercial use by and in the laboratory or other nonprofit entity.” 81
The expansive definition of “commercial use” might suggest that
the philosophy underlying the AIA is one that places universities as
equivalent to other commercial entities. But that conclusion would
ignore the linguistic trick that is at the heart of the prior use defense. By
limiting the scope of patent infringement, the prior use defense protects
consumers and marketplace competition by exempting an entity that has
made prior commercial use of a patented invention before certain critical
dates relevant to the patenting process. Effectively, these prior
commercial uses are placed in the prior art not to invalidate the patent in
question, but to narrow its reach. However, by extending the protection
only to prior commercial users, the AIA offers no protection to prior
users who are non-commercial. 82 One could argue that patent owners
would have less incentive to pursue non-commercial prior users because
there would be limited damages to recover, notwithstanding the
possibility of an injunction against these prior users. If universities are
left exposed to patent liability when they would otherwise qualify as
prior users, the expansive definition equalizes the treatment of
universities and commercial prior users. Therefore, the definition of
commercial use implicitly recognizes the difference between universities
and commercial entities.
What is the difference? Does the recognized difference support
either of the alternative models for treatment of universities? Arguably
either model one or model two can explain the difference implicit in the
text of the prior use defense. Folding university research use into
commercial use would suggest the university as a locus of pure research,
where even activities that could lead to patenting are pursued for the
goals of pure research. Furthermore, the need to include university
research within commercial use could reflect a broader public purpose
for university activity that requires shelter from the specter of patent
infringement. While that purpose may go undefined, the drafters of the

81.
82.

§ 273(c)(2).
See § 273(a).
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AIA seem to recognize a public purpose for universities. Interestingly,
such public purpose or commitment to pure research may also explain
the carve-out for commercial use. It will be interesting to see how prior
use is applied. Although, based on past experience in the United States
and in Germany, the defense may never be actually raised.
As a comparison, it is useful to consider the defense of state
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for copyright and patent
infringement. Immunity for patent was the subject of a 1999 Supreme
Court decision, which was applied to copyright infringement by lower
courts. 83 The rationale for immunity is based on the immunity of states
for suits for damages in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.
While the constitutional basis for state immunity rests in a questionable
reading of the constitutional text, the Supreme Court has found state
immunity in federal court to be broad and Congress’s ability to abrogate
that immunity narrow. 84 Consequently, state universities are immune
from suit for damages arising from claims of copyright and patent
infringement. 85
Immunity illustrates why state governments, and not solely state
universities, are special for copyright and patent laws. State
governments, arguably, engage in their own efforts at innovation. While
they cannot enact legislation that conflicts with patent and copyright
laws directly or on federal policy grounds, state legislatures can pursue
innovation goals through other means, such as supporting start-up
businesses or university research and development. University
incubators, technology transfer offices, and research funding are
examples of state initiatives targeting innovation. 86 Furthermore, when
the federal government limits its own support of research and
development activities, as it did with funding of stem cell research
during the Bush Administration, state governments can fill the gap if
they choose. The primary instrument for states driving innovation is the
83. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
84. See e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
85. Florida Prepaid v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 627, 647-48; see also Gary Pulsinelli,
Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to Liberate Researchers at State Universities
from Liability for Intellectual Property Infringements, 82 WASH. L. REV. 275, 279 (2007).
86. See generally Clovia Hamilton, University Technology Transfer and Economic
Development: Proposed Cooperative Economic Development Agreements Under the Bayh-Dole
Act, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 409-12 (2003); Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research
Lab: Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L.
REV. 407, 418-21 (2007).
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university. Immunity from copyright and patent infringement allows
state entities to incorporate and disseminate federally protected
intellectual property in pursuit of their own technology
commercialization efforts.
State immunity, however, would not extend to private universities.
Perhaps this reflects the view that private universities are often the
instruments of federal research initiatives. But that explanation is less
than satisfactory. Immunity for state universities may create incentives
for joint ventures among private and public universities to pursue
regional development efforts. Although we do not find extensive
evidence for such ventures arising from the pursuit of immunity, the
Court’s broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment might promote
such ventures. More to the point, the different treatment of state and
private universities could be seen as a boost to public universities who
might better compete with private universities for commercialization
projects. This policy justification is undermined by the availability of
express waivers of immunity when a private company partners with a
state university. 87 Nonetheless, state universities acting unilaterally
would find the immunity beneficial.
C. Universities as Patent Enforcers
While the AIA shelters universities as patent infringers, proposed
legislation to regulate non-practicing entities protects universities as
patent enforcers. 88 Proposed patent reform seeks to punish entities that
simply accumulate patent portfolios with no intent to commercialize or
practice the patented technologies, but instead have the intent to initiate
patent infringement suits that will result in settlements. Proposals for
curbing these frivolous lawsuits include heightened pleading standards,
automatically awarding attorney’s fees if the non-practicing entity loses
the lawsuit, and requirements of specificity in both pleading and in any
cease and desist letters sent prior to initiation of litigation.89 Advocates
for universities have sought a carve-out for these proposed reforms on
the theory that while universities may not commercialize patents, their
intent in acquiring a patent portfolio is not to bring frivolous litigation. 90
The advocates’ implied argument is even stronger: that patent litigation
87. See generally Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and
University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1489-97
(2000).
88. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Congress (2015).
89. See Innovation Act, H.R. 9.
90. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 39-46.
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brought by universities would almost certainly not be frivolous and
pursued solely for settlement value. Consequently, patent reform would
inappropriately characterize universities as patent trolls and unfairly
increase their burden for protecting legitimate patent rights as compared
to commercial patent owners. While the AIA creates a carve-out for
universities by equating their use with commercial prior users, proposed
carve-outs for universities seek to distinguish them from noncommercial users pursuing frivolous litigation.
In constructing the proposed carve-out, the goal is not to
characterize universities as another class of commercial entity. Instead,
the special status of universities is implicit, and the concern is that
universities are unable to exercise their legitimate patent rights. The goal
arguably is not to protect universities as the locus for pure research
because the argument for exemption rests on the commercial interests of
universities to create and own patent portfolios in order to generate a
stream of licensing revenue. The second model for understanding
universities is implicated in this argument. Commercialization is seen as
a means to some unspecified end, rather than an end in itself. As a result,
universities need special treatment to distinguish them from other patent
holding entities that are not engaged in full-scale commercialization, but
instead seek to monetize patents through licensing. 91
Our discussion of the treatment of universities under patent and
copyright laws seems to have come full circle. With respect to patent
ownership, universities do not obtain special treatment under the BayhDole and are subject to the same rules of assignment and transfer as
other entities. But proposed debates over troll legislation recognize the
special reasons why universities own patents. Therefore, university
patent ownership requires special treatment in order that patent rights are
not lost as universities seek unique ways of monetizing patents without
engaging in full-scale commercial use of the patented technologies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Universities are special for patent and copyright laws, at least in
some limited ways. This paper, at a minimum, documents the ways in
which the law carves out special rules for universities. However, more
broadly, the paper shows how these special rules support policies unique
to the role of universities in the innovation ecosystem within which they
91. See Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The
Disparate Impact of eBay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
331, 335 (2006).
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compete with for-profit entities whose purpose extends beyond pure
research. An open question is whether existing special rules are adequate
for protecting the interests of universities without balkanizing the federal
policies regulating and promoting innovation.
While the focus of this Article is on universities, the broader
concern is understanding how intellectual property laws are tailored to
various organizational contexts. This topic has not been adequately
studied. There is a growing scholarly literature on transaction costs and
intellectual property. 92 But the interactions between organizational
choice and intellectual property have not inspired as much research as
they should. Whether to form a profit or non-profit, to organize as a
partnership or a corporation, or to use contractors or employees are
business choices that may well be driven by goals of intellectual
property. This initial study of universities is a foray into the broader
inquiry of intellectual property policy and business organizations. While
intellectual property laws may be tailored to choices of business
organizations, the case of universities shows how general rules can
evolve to accommodate complex institutions with multiple goals that
play a critical role in federal and state policies for invention, innovation,
and development.

92. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Transactional Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing
of Intellectual Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2005).
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